This paper analyzes how property rights affect the allocation of firms' available resources among different types of assets. In particular, we investigate emp irically for a large number of countries whether firms in environments with more secure property rights allocate available resources more towards intangible assets and consequentially grow faster. We find that improved asset allocation due to better property rights has an effect on growth in sectoral value added equal to improved access to financing arising from greater financial development. The results are robust using various samples and specifications, including controlling for growth opportunities. 
Recently, a large number of papers have established that financial development fosters growth and that a country's financial development is related to its institutional characteristics, including its legal framework. The financial development and growth literature has established that finance matters for growth both at the macro-economic and micro-economic level (King and Levine 1993 and Levine 1997) . The law and finance literature has found that financial markets are better developed in countries with strong legal frameworks. These well-developed financial markets make it easier for firms to attract financing for their investment needs (Rajan and Zingales 1998 , La Porta et al. 1998 , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998 . Related work has established that debt structures of firms differ across institutional frameworks (Rajan and Zingales 1995 , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999 , and Booth et al. 2000 . 1 Thus far the literature has not paid much attention to differences across countries in terms of firms' asset structure, i.e., differences in the allocation of investible funds by firms across various types of assets. However, these differences are large as well. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that firms in developing countries have higher proportions of fixed assets to total assets and less intangible assets than firms in developed countries. This is surprising as the literature on firms' optimal capital structure (Harris and Raviv 1991) suggests that a lack of long-term financing -typical in a developing country -would make it more difficult to finance fixed assets. Why is it that firms in developing countries have more fixed assets? Is it that they need more fixed collateral to attract external financing? Or does the preference f or fixed assets and a corresponding lower share of intangible assets arise in countries with worse property rights because the returns on fixed assets are easier to secure from the firm's point of view than the returns on intangible assets? More generally, what is the role of property rights in terms of affecting investment patterns of firms?
In this paper, we empirically explore the role of property rights in influencing the allocation of investable resources. We start from the well-established propositio n that greater financial sector development increases the availability of external resources and thereby enhances firm investment. We also acknowledge the literature demonstrating the importance of a good legal framework and well-established property rights for overall economic growth. In terms of channels through which property rights affect firm growth, we argue that the degree of property rights protection affects the allocation of investable resources. At the firm level, we can use the term property rights as referring to the protection of entrepreneurial and other investment in firm assets. We argue that a firm operating in a market with weaker property rights may be led to invest more in fixed assets relative to intangible assets as it finds it relatively more difficult to secure returns from intangible assets than from fixed assets.
The argument goes as follows. A firm is always at risk of not getting the returns from its assets (tangible or intangible) due to actions by its own employees, other firms, or the government. For the firm's employees and other firms (in particular, powerful competitors) it is relatively easy to steal the intangible assets of a firm if property rights are not secure. In a narrow sense, this is because the value of many intangible assetspatents (property rights to inventions and other technical improvements), copyrights (property rights to authors, artists, and composers), and trademarks (property rights for distinctive commercial marks or symbols) -purely derive from the existence of (intellectual) property rights. Without property rights protection, employees can simply walk away with many a firm's intangible assets and competitors can easily copy them. As such, property rights in a narrow sense are very important for securing returns to intangible assets. Stealing physical property, such as buildings and machinery, in contrast is more difficult, particular for competing firms, even when general property rights are not secure. In a broader sense therefore, property rights matter more to secure returns from intangible assets than from tangible assets. Since there is no apparent reason to expect that the risk of expropriation by the government is higher for tangible assets than for intangible assets, it follows that property rights matter more for intangible assets than for tangible assets. More generally, we argue that the degree to which firms allocate resources in an optimal way will depend on the strength of a country's property rights, with the allocation effect being important for consequent firm growth.
Across countries, firm growth will also be affected by the development of financial markets. As such, there are two effects to consider in a cross-country study, a finance effect and an asset allocation effect. The finance effect will determine the available resources for investment and thus affect firm growth. The asset allocation effect will determine the efficiency of firm investment and thus also affect growth. We empirically investigate the importance of the finance and asset allocation effects for different industries in a large number of countries. We find less growth in countries with a lower level of financial development because firms lack access to finance and thus underinvest.
And in countries with less secure property rights, there is less growth because the allocation of firms' investment is inefficient as firms underinvest in intangible assets.
Empirically, the two effects are equally important drivers of growth in sectoral value added. The results are robust to using different country samples and estimation techniques, including instrumental variables and variations in country controls.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews the related literature, develops the finance and asset allocation effects, and presents our methodology to separate the two effects empirically. Section II presents the data used in our empirical application. Section III presents the empirical results concerning the relationships between growth in value added and the finance and asset allocation effects. Section IV presents a number of robustness tests. Section V concludes.
I. Related Literature and Hypothesis
Our work is related to several strands of literature. The starting point is the work by King and Levine (1993) , Levine and Zervos (1998) , and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) that has established an empirical link between financial development and economic growth.
Also related is the law and finance literature initiated by La Porta et al. (1997) . 2 The law and finance literature has established that financial sector development is higher in countries with better legal systems and stronger creditor rights since such environments increase the ability of lenders to collateralize their loans and finance firms.
The second strand we draw on is the capital structure literature (Myers 1977 , Titman and Wessels 1988 , and Harris and Raviv 1991 The third strand of literature relates to the role of property rights in affecting overall investment and investment patterns. Besley (1995) shows the role of property rights for investment incentives and provides evidence of the importance of property rights in the context of land ownership by farmers in Ghana. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) show for a sample of firms in post-communist countries that weaker property rights discourage the reinvestment of firm earnings, even when bank loans are available, sugge sting that secure property rights are both a necessary and sufficient condition for entrepreneurial investment. The role of property rights in affecting investment patterns has also been acknowledged, although less explicitly studied. Mansfield (1995) hints that there may be a relationship between protection of property rights and the allocation of investable resources between fixed and intangible assets. Using a survey of firm managers, he states that "most of the firms we contacted seemed to regard intellectual property rights protection to be an important factor" … "[influencing] investment decisions". Stern, Porter and Furman (2000) show that the strength of a country's intellectual property rights affect its innovative capacity, as measured by the degree of international patenting. In developing countries, the lower degree of investment in intangible assets may relate to the weaker protection of property rights. More generally, the institutional economics literature (North 1990) suggests that investment in particular types of assets will be higher the more protected the property rights of the assets are.
Empirically, these three strands have not yet merged in investigating the effects of institutions on both firm financing and asset allocation, and consequently growth. The law and finance literature has already established that firms in a country with a better legal framework and more developed financial markets find it easier to attract external financing. Empirical investigation of how a country's property rights protection affects firms' asset allocation has not yet occurred. Here we want to test two hypotheses: firms in countries with better developed financial systems will have more access to finance and will therefore be able to invest more overall; and, firms in countries with better property rights will invest more efficiently across types of assets. In turn, both aspects will be reflected in higher growth rates.
For our empirical test, we use the setup of Rajan and Zingales (1998, RZ hereafter) to assess the relationship between financial and legal development and growth. 4 Let there be m countries, each indicated by index k, and n industries, each indicated by index j.
The RZ-model then relates the growth in real value added in a sector j in a particular country k to a number of country and firm-specific variables. In case of RZ, the specific test focuses on financial development and the argument of RZ is that financially dependent firms can be expected to grow more in countries with a higher level of financial development. In addition to including country indicators and industry indicators, they overcome some of the identification problems encountered in standard cross-country growth regressions by interacting a country characteristic (financial development of a particular country) with an industry characteristic (external financial dependence of a particular industry). This approach is less subject to criticism regarding an omitted variable bias or model specification than traditional approaches and allows them to isolate the impact of financial development on growth. In the regression results explaining sectoral growth, RZ find a positive sign for the interaction between the external financial dependence ratio and the level of financial development. They also find a similar effect when including an interaction term between the typical external dependence variable for the particular sector and the quality of a country's legal framework.
The results of RZ provide support for the law and finance effect. We expand the RZ model to test for the asset allocation effect. We add to the basic model in RZ a variable that is the interaction of the typical ratio for each industrial sector of intangible-to-fixed assets and an index of the strength of countries' property rights. We then test whether industrial sectors that typically use many intangible assets grow faster (slower) in countries with more (less) secure property rights. If intangible-intensive sectors grow more in countries with better property right s, then we have indirect evidence that property rights affect firms' asset choices and consequently through that channel growth. We also perform a number of robustness tests on the importance of controlling for countryspecific factors and using instrumental variables to control for the possible (residual) endogeneity of some variables.
In line with RZ, we use US firm data to construct proxies at the industry level for the typical external dependence for a particular industrial sector and the typical ratio of intangible-to-fixed assets for a particular industry. The presumption here is that the welldeveloped financial markets and the well-protected property rights in the U.S. should allow US firms to achieve the desired financial and asset structures for their respective industrial sector. This approach offers a way to identify the desired extent of external dependence and the optimal asset mix of an industry anywhere in the world. 5 It assumes that there are technological and economic reasons why some industries depend more on external finance and intangible assets than others, and that these differences, to a large degree, prevail across countries. This does not mean that we assume a sector in two countries with the same degree of property protection to have exactly the same optimal mix of intangibles and tangible assets. Local conditions such as growth opportunities are allowed to differ between countries. We only assume the rank order of optimal asset mixes across industries to be similar across countries. Furthermore, we explicitly conduct tests for the importance of this assumption.
Following RZ, the regressions include the industry's market share in total manufacturing in the specific country to control for differences in growth potential across industries. Industries with large market shares may have less growth potential than industries with small initial market shares when there is an industry-specific convergence.
The initial share may also help to control for other variations between countries, suc h as in their initial comparative advantage among certain industries based on factors other than financial development and property rights protection. Finally, in lines with RZ, we use country and industry dummies. The final specification is as follows:
5 The advantage of this approach is that we do not need information on the actual asset mix for industries in different countries. The comparability of such data would be limited as accounting practices, in particular with respect to intangible assets, differ greatly around the world. 
II. Data
We use industry-specific and country-specific data from a variety of sources. Table 1 presents an overview of the variables used in the empirical analysis and their sources.
Most of the variables are self-explanatory and have been used in other cross-country studies of firm financing structures and firm growth.
In line with RZ, we use the ratio of private credit to GDP as proxy for financial development. As proxies for the level of protection of property rights, we use three broad indexes of property rights, two indexes of intellectual property rights, as well as a specific index of patent rights. These indexes of property rights come from different sources, each having some advantages and disadvantages. Our main property rights index is the rating of protection of property rights from the Index of Economic Freedom constructed by the Heritage Foundation. This is a relatively broad index of property rights, is available for a large set of countries and has been used by other researchers (for example, Johnson et al. 1998 , and La Porta et al. 1999 , 2002 . A second index of property rights rates the protection of intellectual property rights in particular by using data on the "Special 301" placements of the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR). "Special 301" requires the USTR to identify those countries that deny adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual property protection. Countries can be placed on different lists depending on their relative protection of intellectual property. For example, countries which have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies or practices and which have the greatest adverse impact on relevant US products are designated "Priority Foreign Countries". As such, the index weights the degree of property rights protection with the economic impact that protection deficiencies have on US trade. We use these qualifications to construct an index of intellectual property rights protection. The third index is the patent rights index constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) . This index focuses more specifically on the protection of patents. A fourth index is the property rights index of the World Economic Table 1 ). The correlation between our main property rights index and the other five indexes of protection of (intellectual) property rights ranges, for example, from 0.49 to 0.78. The fact that the property rights indexes relate to different time periods could nevertheless raise concerns in our specification, in part because property rights may have evolved in response to economic performance. We believe these concerns to be small, most importantly, because measures of institutional frameworks have been found to be stable over long periods of time (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002) . Also, RZ show that the sample means of the accounting standards variable they use do not differ significantly between 1983 and 1990. This stability also applies to our property rights indexes, which do not change much over the time for which they are available. Table 2 shows that the mean property rights index for countries sampled in the first and last available year is not statistically significantly different for any of the three indexes. Importantly, the sample mean of the Ginarte and Park patents rights index -the only index for which we have data for the period 1980-89 -for countries sampled in 1980 does not differ statistically significantly from the sample mean in 1990 for the same set of countries. In addition, we find that the relative ordering of the different property rights indexes does not change much over time, as the Spearman rank order correlations of the respective indexes are high. A t-test of independence further confirms that the property rights indexes in the first and last available year are not independent. As a further robustness check, we also do our regressions instrumenting the property rights indexes with variables that predate the period 1980-89, using the methodology used by Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) . Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the country-specific variables grouped by developing and developed countries (Annex Table 2 presents the same summary statistics, but by individual country). We only use the developing versus developed countries classification to illustrate the differences in the various variables by institutional settings. The country summary statistics show that, as a group, developing countries have less developed financial systems, weaker law and order systems, worse protection of (intellectual) property rights, and fewer patents per capita. All variables except for the stock market capitalization-to-GDP ratio and the accounting standards show a statistically significant difference between the two groups of countries. Other work has documented extensively the differences in the degree of law and order between developed and developing countries. This difference in legal frameworks partly relates to the difference in the credit-to-GDP ratio between these two groups of countries, where low contract enforcement environments have hindered the development of financial systems in developing countries.
The degree of financial development and the protection of property rights tend to go together and are both related to the overall level of development of the country. As such, analyzing the differential effects of financial development and property rights on the level of external financing available and the allocation of investment across different assets could be difficult; however, the correlation between the two concepts is not perfect. That is, there exist countries with good property rights and underdeveloped financial systems. Chile, for example, scores high on the protection of property rights (property rights index equals 5) but its level of financial development is only average (private credit-to-GDP is 36 percent). France, on the other hand, has a well-developed financial system (reflected by a level of private credit-to-GDP of 54 percent) but the protection of its property rights is only average (with a property rights index of 4).
Calc ulating the simple correlation between the property rights index and the level of financial development, 0.59, confirms that the relationship between the two concepts is high but not perfect. The correlations of the interaction variables are even less perfect, less than 0.20 (see further Annex Table 3 ).
Our dataset includes 45 countries. 6 For the growth regressions, as in RZ, we need to drop the benchmark country, the United States, and we are therefore left with 44
countries. As we collected additional data, the number of countries included in our dataset somewhat exceeds that in RZ, who use data on 41 countries. For robustness, we also estimated the model using the subset of countries in RZ and results did not change.
Similarly to RZ, we construct benchmark data on an industry basis. We use the benchmark data from RZ for all of our industry variables, but add the intangible-to-fixedassets ratio. We assume that the intangible-to-fixed-assets ratio for each industry in the U.S. forms a good benchmark (similar to RZ who use the US external financial dependence ratio as a benchmark). We refer to the ratio of intangible-to-fixed assets as the intangible intensity. In the same way RZ calculates the external financial dependence ratios by industry, we calculate the intangible intensity benchmark using Compustat-data on US firms for the years 1980-89. We measure intangibles by the net value of intangible assets, i.e., Compustat item 33. Generally, intangibles are assets that have no physical existence in themselves but represent rights to enjoy some privilege. In Compustat, this item includes: blueprints or building designs, patents, copyrights, trademarks, franchises, organizational costs, client lists, computer software patent costs, licenses, and goodwill show that the various technical and economic reasons that make various types of products require different input mixes can be benchmarked well at the indus try level.
III. Empirical Results
In this section, the results of the regression model of section I are presented. The dependent variable is the growth in real value added in a particular sector in a particular country over the 1980-89 period. The basic regression specification is OLS and the results are presented in Table 5 . We find that industrial sectors that rely relatively more on external finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with better developed financial markets because the coefficient for the interactive variable credit-to-GDP times external financial dependence is statistically significant (at the one percent level, column 1). Hence, consistent with the findings of RZ we find that financial development facilitates economic growth through greater availability of external financing. As noted by Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and others, the quality of the legal system influences financial sector development and overall growth. Interacting the external financial dependence variable with the index of the quality of the legal framework used by La Porta et al. (1998) , instead of the financial development variable, also leads to a positive coefficient (not reported). The regression result confirms the law and finance view that increased availability of external financing and better legal systems enhance firm growth.
In terms of the asset allocation effect, we find that industrial sectors using relatively more intangible assets develop faster in countries with better protection of property rights because the coefficient for the interactive variable property rights times intangible intensity is statistically significant and positive (column 2). Hence, better property rights facilitate economic growth as they favor growth through better asset allocation, i.e., in firms that would naturally choose a higher share of investment in intangible assets.
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The asset allocation effect on growth appears to be in addition to the increase in firm growth due to greater external financing since, in the regressions where both the external financial dependence and the intangible intensity variables are included (column 3), both interactive variables are statistically significant. Additionally, the coefficients in these regressions for both effects are of similar magnitudes as in the two regressions where each of them was included separately (columns 1-2), suggesting that the two variables measure complementary effects.
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The effects of external financial development and property protection on firm growth are not only both statistically significant but are also equally economically important. We can use the regression coefficient estimates of comparison, the average growth rate is 3.4 percent per year. Therefore, a differential rate of 1.4 percent due to an improvement in the property rights index from 3 to 5 represents a large increase.
The effect of financial development on differential real firm growth can be calculated in a similar way using the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of model 1 in Table 5 of 0.140. The coefficient estimate predicts the difference between the growth rate of the 75 th and 25 th percentile external financial dependence industry to be 1.4 percent higher in a country at the 75 th percentile of financial development compared to at the 25 th percentile. 9 Thus, the effects of property protection and financial development on differential firm growth are not only both statistically significant, but also of similar economic importance. In other words, the asset allocation effect is economically as important as the finance effect.
Thus far, our specifications have focused on the differential effect on growth of property rights across industries with different asset mixes (captured by the interaction term of property rights and the intangible-intensity measure). To avoid possible biases caused by any omitted country-specific regressors, we have included country dummies to capture any institutional or other differences, such as comparative advantage or general level of development, affecting growth. Since we are less interested in the importance of general country differences, we use this approach rather than a vector of specific country control variables. Still, the use of country dummies could introduce a misspecification to the extent that any omitted institutional differences important for growth are correlated with our two interaction variables. Examples of such country-specific variables that have been used in the general growth literature include, besides financial depth and property rights, the level of per capita GDP, human capital, and other institutional variables (Romer 1990 , Barro 1991 , and Levine and Zervos 1998 . Furthermore, we want to analyze the first-order country effects of property rights to investigate whether property rights affect firm growth mainly through the asset allocation channel or as well in any other ways. We therefore replace our country dummies with country-specific institutional and other variables and thus perform a robustness check on whether any of our earlier results are affected if we control in other ways for country differences.
We start by documenting the fact that the effects of better property rights on growth work mostly through improved asset allocation as opposed through, for example, an improvement in the overall business environment increasing growth opportunities. We illustrate this by including in our basic regression specification the property rights index (and private credit-to-GDP) directly in addition to the interacted variable. The results are reported in column 4 of Table 5 , where we exclude country dummies. We do not find a direct, statistically significant effect of the quality of a country's property rights on industrial sector growth. Most importantly, including the property rights index directly does not change the magnitude or the significance of the coefficients for the interaction variables in any meaningful way. Both the financial dependence and the asset mix interaction variables remain statistically significant and neither change much in terms of magnitude. This suggests that the major effect of improved property rights on sectoral growth operates through improve ments in asset allocation and that the interaction variable does not capture any general effects of, for example, improvements in the business environment leading to greater growth opportunities.
For other country-specific variables, we use the ratio of private credit to GDP in The quality of the legal system is measured by the law and order tradition variable of La Porta et al. (1998) and is also expected to have a positive effect on growth. The accounting standards indicator is an index reflecting the quality of accounting and is taken from RZ. This variable is also expected to have a positive effect on growth since it proxies for the quality of information investors have regarding firm and firms regarding investment prospects. Per capita GDP is inc luded to capture the convergence effects of the economy as a whole to a long-run steady state and is expected to have a negative coefficient (see, among others, Barro 1991). The model continues to include industry dummies to control for any sector-specific effects and the property rights indexes. Since the country variables included in the two interaction terms -private credit to GDP and an index of property rights -are now also part of the country controls, we can assess both the overall effect of financial development and property protection on value added growth as well as the finance and asset allocation effects captured by the two interaction terms. Note that data on accounting standards is missing for some countries, reducing the sample of countries to 33.
The results of this specification are reported in column 5 of Table 5 . Except for the human capital variable, the country controls have the expected relationships with growth.
The direct effect of the quality of property rights on growth remains insignificant, however, which suggests that better property rights of themselves do not translate into higher growth rates of sectoral value added. The depth of the financial systemsmeasured by private credit to GDP and the size of the stock market as a ratio to GDPhas a positive and statistically significant influence on growth in sectoral value added.
The degree of human capital in the country, proxied by the average years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age, and the degree to which the rule of law applies do not have a statistically significant effect on growth in sectoral value added.
The accounting index, however, is statistically significantly positive. The general level of development, proxied by the log of income per capita, has a negative sign, confirming the convergence effect.
The focus of our attention, the interaction between property rights and the allocation of resources, is very robust to these changes in model specification. The coefficient on the interaction term between the property rights indexes and the intangible-intensity measure remains positive and statistically significant in both specifications. The size of the coefficient is also only somewhat less from those in the models with country dummies, and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the one percent level. The general result on the importance of the asset allocation effect is thus not altered. Also, the interaction term between financial development and external financial dependence remains statistically significant positive. The regression results in columns 4 and 5 thus
show that the effect of property rights on growth operates in an important way through asset allocation, and not through a first order effect on growth.
Another concern is that the quality of property rights is affected by the investment behavior of firms and the resulting growth patterns. we set their mortality rates to zero to account for this.
The instrumental variables (IV) results based on the specification of column 2 are presented in columns 6-8, using respectively only legal origin, mortality rates, or both as instruments. The results are very robust to the use of i nstruments. 10 We again find a statistically significant effect of property rights on growth in sectoral value added through the asset allocation of resources. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficients for the interaction variable increases when using mortality rates as an instrumental variable (columns 7 and 8). Next, we re-estimate the regression model in column 3 using The results are presented in column (9) and confirm our previous findings, i.e., that the protection of private property ha s a statistically significant effect on growth in sectoral value added through the asset allocation of resources.
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As an additional investigation into the channels through which financial development and property rights affect firm growth, and following RZ, we analyze whether industries in countries with better financial development and property rights grow faster because new establishments are added to the industry or because existing establishments grow faster. There are two reasons why it is interesting to decompose the effects of access to financing and asset allocation in terms of number and average size of firms. First, highlighted by RZ, the creation of new establishments is more likely to require external funds, while the expansion of existing establishments may more easily rely on internal funds. Thus, the effect of financial development could be more pronounced for new firms than for the growth of existing firms. Second, new firms are often set up in reaction to and to take advantage of new technological developments, while established firms tend to grow through expansion of scale, perhaps also because they are slower in reacting to new developments. 12 Furthermore, existing firms may be able to preserve the value of their assets in ways other than resorting to formal property rights (for example, using their name recognition, distribution or supply networks, or general economic and political influence). Thus, the importance of property rights that protect the returns to (new) technology and help assure a good allocation of an economy's overall resources might be more pronounced for the emergence of new firms than for the growth of existing firms.
As before, we follow RZ and use data derived from the UN Industrial Statistics
Yearbook database for the growth in the number of establishments and the growth in the average size of existing establishments. The growth in the number of establishments is calculated by RZ as the logarithm of the number of end-of-period establishments less the logarithm of the number of beginning-of-period establishments. The average size of establishments in the industry is calculated by dividing the value added in the industry by the number of establishments, with the growth in average size again defined as the difference in logarithms. RZ report that in their sample of countries roughly two-thirds of the growth in value-added results from an increase in the average size of existing establishments, while the remaining one-third is accounted for by an increase in the number of establishments.
We use the same specification as for our basic regression but with the growth in number of establishments or the growth in average size as the dependent variable instead of the growth in total value added by sector. As Table 6 indicates, the external financial dependence interacted with the financial development variable is statistically significant in explaining both the growth in the number of establishments and the growth in average firm size. This contrasts with RZ who do not find any statistical significance, perhaps because they use accounting standards as a measure for financial development (see their Table 7 ) rather than private credit to GDP and do not include the asset allocation interaction variable.
Interestingly, the asset allocation variable interacted with the property rights variable is only significant when explaining the growth in the number of establishments and not when explaining the growth in the average size of firms. This finding is consistent across all of our measures of property rights (not reported). It is also not affected by using as instrumental variable either legal origin or settler mortality (columns 3-8). It suggests, in terms of affecting growth through asset allocation, that the protection of property rights is most important through stimulating the growth of new establishments. Well-protected property rights can thus indirectly influence growth by allowing new firms to come to market in those industries that typically rely less on tangibles in their optimal production mix. For established firms relying more on intangible inputs, growth seems less affected by the strength of property rights in the country. This may be because such firms have other means of protecting their returns from investments.
IV. Further robustness tests
We have already shown that the results are robust to different control variables, the use of instrumental variables and changes in the sample of countries. We next present evidence that the results are also robust to the particular measure of protection of property rights chosen, to alternative means of controlling for country-differences, and to differences in growth opportunities related to the level of general development.
First, we use the five alternative measures of the degree to which countries protect property rights: "Special 301", the patent rights index of Ginarte and Park (1997), the property rights index and the intellectual property rights index of the World Economic Forum and the property rights index of Knack and Keefer (1995) . The results are presented in Table 7 and are very similar to those of Table 5 . Both with and without the interaction term between financial development and external dependence, we find statistically significant coefficients on the interaction term between the intangibleintensity measure and all of the five alternative property rights measures. The results with the alternative measures of the degree of property rights protection are also robust to the use of legal origin and European settler mortality as instruments (not reported).
Second, we want to investigate whether growth opportunities differ across industries and countries in such a way that they confound the relationships between our interaction variables and growth in sectoral value added. In particular, it is possible that the external financial dependence and asset mix variables are proxies for growth opportunities at the sectoral level. Provided that financial development is high and property rights are protected, it may not be those industries with a particular external financial dependence or intangibles intensity that grow fast, but rather those with better growth opportunities. If these growth opportunities happen to be correlated with our financial development and property rights variables, then a bias in the estimations can arise. In particular, countries with similar levels of financial development or property rights may experience the same growth patterns across industries because their firms face similar patterns of growth prospects, not because their levels of financial sector development or quality of property rights protection imply a greater supply of resources for firms or a better allocation of resources by firms. Correspondingly, countries with different levels of financial development or property rights may have different growth opportunities and consequently grow differently, not because of differences in the supply of external financing or the protection of property rights.
In a recent paper, Fisman and Love (2002b) explore this hypothesis using the RZmodel, focusing on financial development. They use the actual US sales growth at the sectoral level as a measure for sectoral growth opportunities at a global level. When they substitute in the interaction term the industry's actual sales growth for the industry's external financial dependence ratio, they find a positive coefficient for this interaction variable. Furthermore, when including both the old and new interaction variable, i.e., the industries' external financial dependence times countries' financial development as well as the actual sales growth times countries' financial development, they find that the external financial dependence variable is no longer statistically significant. This suggests, if indeed actual US sales growth rates are a good proxy for (global) growth opportunities, that it is the similarity (or difference) in growth opportunities for countries at similar (or different) levels of financial development which leads to the positive relationship between growth and the interaction variable external financial dependence times countries' financial sector development.
A similar possibility may arise with respect to the asset allocation hypothesis and our asset mix variable. If growth opportunities systematically vary across countries with the degree of property rights protection, then a statistically significant coefficient for our interaction variable could be inaccurately interpreted as support for the asset allocation hypothesis. To investigate this possibility, we use the same approach as Fisman and
Love. Specifically, we interact both the external financial development and property rights variables with the US sectoral sales growth rates and include these two new interaction variables in the regressions. The columns 2-4 in Table 8 show the results of adding the interacted US sales growth variable in this way to the model, with column 1 repeating the results of column 3 of Table 5 . Column 2 confirms the result of Fisman and
Love, that is, the interaction term between financial development and US sales growth "dominates" the interaction term between financial development and external financial dependence in terms of sectoral growth, as the coefficient on the interaction term financial development and external financial dependence is no longer statistically significant. In Column 3 we add the interaction variable between property rights and US sales growth. Although this new interaction variable is also statistically significant, our main result -a positive relationship between sectoral growth and the interaction variable property rights and asset mix -is robust to this change in specification, although the statistical significance for our main result decreases somewhat. When we add both new interaction variables, i.e., between US sales growth and financial development and between US sales growth and property rights, to the model (column 4), our main result still holds, but the RZ and Fisman and Love variables are no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the asset allocation effect remains an important explanation of firm growth.
The measure of growth opportunities used in Fisman and Love, i.e., the actual sales growth at the sectoral level, is an ex-post measure. It is therefore highly correlated with actual growth in value added, our dependent variable, and as such may not be the best measure to use for growth opportunities and could explain the reduced significance of the interaction variables in columns 3 and 4. As an alternative, more forward-looking proxy for growth opportunities, we use Tobin's Q ratio, i.e., the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of its assets. We use Compustat data to construct the industry-level median of the time-average Tobin's Q of US firms during the period 1980-89. The results of using this alternative measure of growth opportunities in the interaction variables are presented in columns 5-7 of Table 8 . In contrast to the actual sales growth measure, we find that the interaction variables with Tobin's Q do not enter significantly in any of the regressions, showing that results are dependent on the proxy used for growth opportunities. Our main result is strengthened, however, as the coefficients for the interaction variable property rights and asset mix become more statistically significant.
This suggests that growth opportunities, as measured by firms' Tobin's Q, do not vary across countries in such a systematic way with the degree of property rights protection as to affect the relationship between property rights and actual growth, through asset allocation.
As a third robustness test, we investigate whether using US sectoral data biases our results in some way. It could be the case, for example, that investment opportunities in poorer countries are different from those in the U.S. due to differences in the general level of a country's development rather than differences in property rights. For a poor country with the same property rights as a rich country, for example, the asset mix across sectors variable may not relate in the same way to relative growth rates as growth opportunities differ because of its general lower level of development. Any relationship between growth and our interaction variable property rights times asset mix may then be spurious as it reflects differences in growth opportunities, and not the asset allocation effect. We test for this possibility by adding an interaction variable between the US sectoral asset mix and countries' per capita GDP to the regression. We use the level of per capita GDP as a measure of the overall level of a country's economic development and of corresponding country-level investment opportunities. The same robustness test was performed by RZ, but then interacting external dependence with per capita GDP. If investment opportunities relate systematically to a country's level of development and affect the ability of sectors with different asset mix to grow, rather than a country's property rights affecting growth through the asset mix chosen, then this new interaction variable should be significant and our old interaction variable no longer. Controlling for differences in the level of development in this way does not alter our main result as the new interaction variable is not statistically significant while our old interaction variable still is (column 8 in Table 8 ). Thus, variations in property rights across countries leading to different growth patterns do not seem to be due to simple differences in investment opportunities related to level of development, but rather to differences in the asset mix chosen in response to variations in property rights.
As an alternative robustness test along the same lines, we test whether, for countries with the same level of property rights, investment opportunities differ in a systematic way with income levels such as to confound the relationship between assets mix and growth. If investment opportunities across sectors do not vary in a systematic way with income level, then for the same level of property rights we should not find an effect across countries of the income level variable interacted with the asset mix variable.
Columns 9 -11 in Table 8 show the results of regressions for three subsamples of countries with each the same degree of protection of property rights (as measured by our main property rights index), but different levels of per capita GDP. Using this specification, we do not find an income level effect since the coefficients for the variable that is the interaction between per capita GDP and asset mix are insignificant in each of the three cases.
V. Conclusions
Countries differ from each other in many ways. Two aspects are the degree of their financial sector development and the quality of their property rights. This paper argues that the existence of an environment with poorly developed financial systems and weak property rights has two effects on firms: first, it reduces the access of firms to external financing; and, second, it leads firms to allocate resources in a suboptimal way. The importance of the lack of financing effect has already been shown in the law and finance literature. We investigate the importance of property rights for firm growth by studying its impact on firms' allocation of investable resources. We show that the effect of insecure property rights on the asset mix of firms, the asset allocation effect, is economically as important as the lack of financing effect as it impedes the growth of firms to the same quantitative magnitude. Furthermore, the asset allocation effect seems to be particularly important in hindering the growth of new firms.
While we use the ratio of tangibles and intangible assets as a measure of asset mix, the implications of our results likely go beyond this particular asset choice and indicate that an efficient allocation of firm resources can be more generally impeded by weak property rights. Our results suggest that the degree to which firms allocate resources in an optimal way will depend on the strength of a country's property rights and that the allocation effect is an important channel of the effect of property rights on firm growth.
Thus, our results have the important policy implication that, equally important as the establishment of a good financial system, requiring in turn a functio ning legal system, is assuring the protection of returns to different type of assets. To the extent that the emergence of the "new economy" has increased the economic returns to assets on which yields are more difficult to secure, then our results would even underestimate the overall costs of weak property rights. If indeed new economy assets and future growth opportunities are more related to intangible assets, then any underallocation of investable resources towards intangible assets is likely to impede the future growth of firms and economies more generally even more so going forward. A rating of property rights in each country (on a scale from 1 to 5). The more protection private property receives, the higher the score. The score is based, broadly, on the degree of legal protection of private property, the probability that the government will expropriate private property, and the country's legal protection to private property. The index equals the median rating for the period 1995-1999. Source: The Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundatio n. We reversed the original order of the index. Intellectual Property (Special 301)
An index of intellectual property rights (on a scale from 1 to 5). The more protection private property receives, the higher the score. The index is calculated using the " Special 301" placements of Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR). Special 301 requires the USTR to identify those countries that deny adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual property protection. Countries which have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies or practices and which have the greatest adverse impact on relevant US products are designated "Priority Foreign Countries". Countries can also be placed on other lists. We assign the following ratings: 1=Priority foreign countries; 2=306 Monitoring; 3=Priority Watch List; 4=Watch List; 5=Not listed. The index equals the median rating for the period 1990-1999. Source: International Intellect ual Property Alliance. Original source: USTR. Patent rights (GP)
An index of patent rights (on a scale from 0 to 5) in 1980. The more protection patents receive, the higher the score. The index criteria are: coverage, membership, duration, enforcement and loss of rights. Source: Ginarte and Park (1997).
Property (WEF)
An index of property rights in each country (on a scale from 1 to 7). The more protection private property receives, the higher the score. 1 indicates that assets are poorly delineated and not protected by law, while 7 indicates that assets are clearly delineated and protected by law. Source: Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum. Intellectual property (WEF) An index of intellectual property rights in each country (on a scale from 1 to 7). The more protection intellectual property receives, the higher the score. 1 indicates that intellectual property protection is weak or non-existent, while 7 indicates that intellectual property protection is equal to the world's most stringent. Source: Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum.
Property (ICRG)
A measure of property rights in each country (on a scale from 0 to 10). Average between 1982 and 1995. The more protection private property receives, the higher the score. The score is based on the average of five measures: quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation risk and repudiation of contracts by the government. Tobin's Q of US firms by ISIC sector over the period 1980-89. Tobin's Q is defined as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities over the book value of total assets. Source: Compustat. Intangible-to-fixed assets (US) Ratio of intangible assets to net fixed assets of US firms by ISIC sector over the period 1980-89. Source: Compustat (US). Intangibles is Compustat item 33 and represents the net value of intangible assets. Intangibles are assets that have no physical existence in themselves, but represent rights to enjoy some privilege. In Compustat, this item includes: blueprints or building designs, patents, copyrights, trademarks, franchises, organizational costs, client lists, computer software patent costs, licenses, and goodwill (except on unconsolidated subsidiaries). Intangibles excludes goodwill on unconsolidated subsidiaries, which are included in Investments and Advances under the Equity Method (Compustat item 31). Net fixed assets is Compustat item 8 and represents net property, plant and equipment, which equals gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat item 7) less accumulated depreciation, depletion and amortization (Compustat item 196) . Table 2 Stability of property rights measures over time
This table reports for each of the three property rights indexes the sample mean and standard deviation for the first year and the last year of the sample period across all sampled countries, the t-statistic for a test of difference in the sample means assuming unequal variances, the rank order correlation coefficient and a test of independence of the property rights indexes in the first year and the last year of the sample period. The null hypothesis of the test of independence is that the property rights indexes are independent. The sources and definitions of the data are reported in Table 1 Table 4 Benchmark US Intangible-to-Fixed assets ratio
The Table 5 Growth, financial dependence, property rights and intangible assets Dependent variable is the real growth in value added of a particular sector in a particular country. Table 1 describes all variables in detail. As measure for protection of property rights we use the property rights index from the Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation. All regressions include industry dummies and a constant but these are not reported. Models (1)- (3) and models (6)- (8) include country dummies but these are not reported. Models (4) and (5) include country-specific variables rather than country dummies. Model 6 uses legal origin as IV for property rights. Model 7 uses European settler mortality as IV for property rights. Model 8 uses legal origin and European settler mortality as IV for property rights. Model 9 uses legal origin as IV for private credit-to-GDP and European settler mortality as IV for property rights. Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. United States is dropped as it is the benchmark. Significance levels a , b and c correspond to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
(1) Table 7 Growth, financial dependence, property rights and intangible assets -Alternative measures of property rights
The dependent variable in all regressions is the real growth in value added of a particular sector in a particular country. Table 8 Growth, financial dependence, property rights and intangible assets -Robustness tests
The dependent variable in all regressions is the real growth in value added of a particular sector in a particular country. Table 1 describes all variables in detail. All regressions include industry dummies, country dummies and a constant but these are not reported. Robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients. Models (9)-(11) include only those observations for which Property rights index takes value 3, resp. 4, resp. 5. United States is dropped as it is the benchmark. Significance levels a , b and c correspond to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) p-values are in parentheses. Significance levels a , b and c correspond to one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.
